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Abstract. Despite the recent advancement in the social robotic field, im-
portant limitations restrain its progress and delay the application of ro-
bots in everyday scenarios. In the present paper, we propose to develop 
computational models inspired by our knowledge of human infants’ so-
cial adaptive abilities. We believe this may provide solutions at an archi-
tectural level to overcome the limits of current systems. Specifically, we 
present the functional advantages that adaptive Theory of Mind (ToM) 
systems would support in robotics (i.e., mentalizing for belief under-
standing, proactivity and preparation, active perception and learning) and 
contextualize them in practical applications. We review current compu-
tational models mainly based on the simulation and teleological theories, 
and robotic implementations to identify the limitations of ToM functions 
in current robotic architectures and suggest a possible future develop-
mental pathway. Finally, we propose future studies to create innovative 
computational models integrating the properties of the simulation and 
teleological approaches for an improved adaptive ToM ability in robots 
with the aim of enhancing human-robot interactions and permitting the 
application of robots in unexplored environments, such as disasters and 
construction sites. To achieve this goal, we suggest directing future re-
search towards the modern cross-talk between the fields of robotics and 
developmental psychology. 
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1 Introduction 
The robotic field has greatly advanced in the last decades and the complexity and so-
phistication of robots have highly improved. However, the application of robotics in 
everyday scenarios still faces some challenges. For example, humans’ positive attitude 
towards non-human agents has increased with the humanoid aspect of robots, however, 
this drops when a mismatch of agent features is noticed [1] due to the robots’ still lim-
ited (non-human-like) social capabilities (uncanny valley effect). Currently, robots’ ar-
chitectures generally rely on association and simulation principles to learn about the 
social world, which enable them to recognize and predict actions from observing other 
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agents performing such actions [2, 3]. However, robots’ recognition of complex mental 
states is still limited, as is their understanding of the humans they interact with. For 
example, although robots can recognize the action of digging through rubble, they do 
not necessarily understand the deeper mental state of the observed agent, such as the 
desire to search for survivors. 
In robotics, the perception of social contexts mostly relies on the passive view of 
stimuli (with few exceptions [4]) and highly prewired knowledge. This means that 
missing elements and features are not actively searched by robots and that their adapt-
ability to new contexts/tasks/agents’ behaviors is limited. Similarly, multiple-agent in-
teractions may be too computationally and sensorially expensive given the inability to 
exploit context-specific information to optimize the computations underlying robots’ 
social interactions. Therefore, one of the main challenges in robotics is to create robots 
that can act as social (human-like) agents to increase robots’ acceptance as social com-
panions and ameliorate human-robot interactions, also in challenging situations [5]. 
Substantial advancements in robotics resulted from the introduction of Deep Neural 
Networks (DNNs). However, online action perception, online learning and generaliza-
tion to new contexts with a sufficient level of spatial and temporal detail to support 
human-robot interaction is still difficult [6]. One of the main issues related to the appli-
cation of DNNs for social interaction is their reliance on suitable datasets. Current 
DNNs algorithms require huge datasets which are mostly recorded by humans, who 
however select points of view which may completely differ from those adopted by ro-
bots. While the performance of these bottom-up recognition methods is continuously 
improved through new architectures [7] and datasets [8], the high dependency of human 
activities on multiple contextual factors and actors' mental states suggests that the size 
of the datasets necessary to achieve a high enough precision for predictive physical 
interaction would be prohibitive. Furthermore, this approach requires substantial train-
ing time and reconfiguration or retraining when new tasks are added.  
An initial solution to these issues was provided by simulation-based methods for the 
extension of datasets through the generation of virtual training data [9] and digital ma-
nipulation of the training data [10]. However, these methods are particularly difficult 
to scale to social interaction tasks because both the virtual training data and the robot’s 
response are strongly affected by contexts of high dimensionality (e.g., other agent’s 
previous actions, current posture, relative position of other objects). The DNNs ap-
proach is also limited given that learning is based on short frames and does not allow 
for an interpretation of the situation or the agent’s mental state. Therefore, this only 
enables the understanding of short and stereotyped interactions. This is in contrast to 
humans’ ability to comprehend the world by adding sequences together, putting them 
into context and relating them to other similar events or their own experiences, feelings, 
mental states. Ultimately, the lack of data in uncertain, previously unexperienced envi-
ronments (e.g., natural disasters) prevents the utilization of standard machine learning 
methods to provide robots with the correct behaviors. 
A way to deal with the strong limits of DNNs and endow robots with social skills 
would be to integrate them in a principled manner with a model-based reasoning system 
[11]. Indeed, we propose to develop future computational models inspired by our 
knowledge of human infants’ mentalizing abilities, as they may provide solutions at an 
architectural level to ameliorate the limits of existing robotic systems. In this paper, we 
present the functional advantages that adaptive mentalizing systems would support in 
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robotics and contextualize them in practical applications. Specifically, we review cur-
rent models and robotic implementations to identify the current limitations and suggest 
a possible future developmental pathway. 
2 Adaptive Theory of Mind for Robots 
Theory of Mind (ToM), or mentalizing, refers to the cognitive capacity to attribute and 
represent others’ mental states [12-14]. Although a definite age at which mentalizing 
develops in humans is yet to be determined, possessing a ToM from an early age [15] 
is an evident demonstration of its importance for human social navigation. In fact, “ex-
ternally observable actions are just observable consequences of unobservable, internal 
causal structures” [16], i.e., mental states. In other words, if a person is running down 
a mountain, his immediate goal is to displace himself from a location to another, 
whereas his underlying intention (e.g., to run away from an avalanche) is not clear until 
the context is analyzed. To a certain extent, humans are able to predict and understand 
others’ actions by observing their behavior, however, having the capability to infer the 
underlying reasons provides an invaluable advantage during social interactions. Given 
that mental states are characterized differently in the literature (see Table 1 for further 
details), a clear definition of ToM is yet to be identified. However, compared to the 
association, simulation and teleological paradigms underlying social perception, the 
highlight of ToM relies on the quantities it extracts (i.e., mental states) rather than the 
computational processes that realize the inferences. A better understanding of how 




2.1 Functional advantages for robotics 
Equipping robots with a ToM would allow them to also access human’s hidden mental 
states, such as intentions, desires and beliefs, and to reason about and react to them 
much like humans do. More specifically, it would facilitate the adaptive attribution of 
mental states to agents, meaning for example that beliefs would be acquired and inten-
tions would be inferred by the robot itself. By equipping robots with an adaptive ToM, 
their application to situations in which specific data are not currently available, due to 
high variability or uncertainty of environments/agents, will be possible (e.g., searching 
and rescuing during disasters or helping in construction sites). In fact, internal be-
liefs/mental states are generally shared by humans and provide important context for 
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higher detail and perceptually-demanding behavior understanding. Finally, providing 
robots with mentalizing abilities would enable them to “express their internal states 
through social interaction” [17], which will answer to the issue expressed by the un-
canny valley effect. The functional advantages of an adaptive ToM for robotics (see 
paper [18] for further details) will now be described (Table 2). 
 
 
Mentalizing for coordinating and managing false beliefs. Until now, ToM has 
mainly been implemented in robotics to allow for the understanding and ability to track 
beliefs in humans [19, 20]. In fact, determining whether a human partner holds true 
beliefs about a situation is an essential requirement for successful human-robot inter-
actions [20], especially during collaborative tasks. Previous studies introduced in robots 
the ability to assume the spatial perspective of the agent they were interacting with [19, 
21], which is a fundamental characteristic of human mentalizing. By enabling robots to 
put themselves in the agents’ shoes and infer their sensorial access, they showed a better 
recognition of mental states and increased performances in belief recognition tasks. In-
terestingly, false-belief tasks (standard experimental paradigm to test ToM in humans 
[22]) were implemented in robots [20] and were passed with the aid of spatial perspec-
tive taking. Future studies should create adaptive ToM architectures which aim at also 
equipping robots with mental perspective taking. This would mean systems in which 
robots are able to autonomously attribute a wider set of mental states, reason about them 
and appropriately react to them. Another approach was recently presented by Rab-
inowitz et al. [8], who proposed a NN able to predict the behavior of multiple agents in 
a false-belief situation given their past and current trajectories. However, as the authors 
mention in their paper, they assume the observer to have access to states and actions of 
all agents, which is not always the case for an embodied agent. Therefore, fully under-
standing and reasoning about agents’ beliefs still represents a challenge for robotics. 
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Mentalizing for proactivity and preparation. Characterizing other agents through 
their beliefs, desires and intentions may allow the anticipation of their behavior before 
they perform any concrete action. Proactivity implies a lower reliance on bottom-up 
inputs in favor of additional top-down control influencing the response of the robot to 
the situation. This is important for the successful application of robots in everyday so-
cial settings and collaborative tasks, as social contexts are highly dynamic and robots 
are required to prepare and act prior to an event rather than just to react to it. An inter-
esting study by Milliez et al. [20] provided an example of a proactive robot which was 
able to reason about the beliefs of a human partner and to communicate important in-
formation that the human had missed for the successful completion of a collaborative 
task. Although the architecture of this robot was based on the ToM principle of per-
spective taking to interact with an agent, the robot was readily provided with several 
hard-coded position hypotheses to make when an object was not visible (contrary to the 
automaticity seen in human behavior). Ultimately, equipping robots with an adaptive 
ToM would allow more efficient and fluid human-robot interactions (e.g., by inde-
pendently positioning themselves in a position easy to spot). 
Mentalizing for (active) perception. Associating intentions and mental states to 
agents’ behavior may encourage observers to search for cues that better explain the 
current situation and enable more precise predictions [23]. Active perception may be 
necessary to eliminate the passive nature of robots’ exploration and understanding of 
environments/agents. For example, in Görür et al. [19] the robot was fed with 100 dif-
ferent observation sequences from which states were estimated with a hidden Markov 
model. This suggests that the important information/features of the scene were readily 
provided to the robot, which was not left to explore and act in the environment to in-
crease the information content derived from its sensorial data. In contrast with the eco-
logical behavior seen in humans, this limits the quality of human-robot interactions. 
Mentalizing for learning. An adaptive ToM for robots would also tackle many of the 
challenges identified in the robotics field by Lake et al. [24]. Integrating ToM develop-
ment principles in the blueprint of an adapting neural architecture for social interaction 
may result in a more time- and cost-efficient learning process compared to DNNs [6]. 
Furthermore, it would decrease the need to select and feed appropriate content to robots 
through expensive datasets, also reducing human errors involved in their preparation 
and permitting increased accuracy. In addition, mentalizing for learning would imply a 
different way of learning about the world. More specifically, most DNN-based action 
recognition systems do not currently distinguish the learning of passive objects dynam-
ics (e.g., the movement of clouds) from that of agents’ behavior (e.g., opening several 
boxes to find lost glasses while searching) and do not take into consideration the inten-
tionality that marks humans’ behaviors. In contrast, we propose that equipping robots 
with mental states understanding and contextualization would provide a means to dis-
tinguish between passive object dynamics and agents behaviors. Finally, predicting in-
teractions and perceiving the mental states of multiple agents simultaneously may be 
particularly demanding both for the sensory and the general cognitive load of the agent. 
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However, humans swiftly deal with these conditions by adaptively allocating their at-
tention to the most significant users based on contextualized knowledge (e.g., while 
playing football, only the intentions of the player with the most relevant location and 
role will be considered) [25]. Therefore, providing robots with similar capabilities 
would alleviate the current issues associated with multi-agent interactions. 
3   Computational modelling of ToM 
 
In the literature, several theories describing human ToM exist [12, 26], however, de-
veloping a computational model inspired by the brain processes underlying human 
mentalizing is particularly challenging. Here, we attempt to better delineate the possible 
brain processes responsible for the development of the mentalizing ability in humans 
with the aim of transferring such features to social robots and stimulating future re-
search in the direction proposed. Specifically, we will describe the limitations and ad-
vantages of two principal accounts which have been contrasted and implicated in the 
development of a ToM in humans, i.e., the teleological and simulation theories. 
 
3.1  Teleological theory for ToM 
The teleological theory is one of the principal accounts utilized to describe the intention 
recognition ability based on observable actions in both adults and infants [27]. Specif-
ically, infants were suggested to attribute a causal intention to an agent according to the 
rationality principle [28]. However, whether this teleological account is a suitable can-
didate mechanism underlying ToM remains questioned. Firstly, the concepts repre-
sented in the mentalistic account can be considered more complex compared to those 
of the teleological account. In fact, although the teleological account is able to process 
actions to derive the goal of an agent in various situations, it is unlikely that the ration-
ality principle may provide access to the unobservable, abstract mental states [29, 30]. 
Indeed, a recent review noted that there are kinds of mindreading contexts that have 
nothing to do with rationality or efficiency [12]. Similarly, rationality, thus the teleo-
logical account, is not very effective when trying to infer mental states which are sub-
jective, as efficiency may not be the prerogative of the agent observed. In addition, 
while the teleological account suggests that infants should not be able to distinguish 
their representation of a scene from that of an agent (thus, reality should be as construed 
by the infants), the mentalistic account presupposes the attribution of a perspective to 
another agent, which may be similar or differ from their own [31].  
Nonetheless, Gergely and Csibra [28] proposed a continuum between the teleologi-
cal constructs (i.e., action, goal-state and situational constraints) and the mentalistic 
ones, with the latter presupposing the same computations and constructs of the former 
but representing more sophisticated, abstract constructs (i.e., intentions, desires and be-
liefs). Furthermore, Baker et al. [32] developed a Bayesian computational model for 
ToM based on the teleological principle that was tested on both adults and infants [33], 
who were suggested to follow this model to infer the mental states behind an agent’s 
behavior using priors. However, this model is computationally demanding and could 
not be directly used to support online interactions. 
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3.2  Simulation theory for ToM 
The simulation theory is the other principal account utilized to describe the intention 
recognition ability based on observable actions in both adults and infants [34, 35]. Spe-
cifically, activation of infants’ motor system was shown both during the observation of 
a grasping action and prior to the visual input once the action could be predicted [35]. 
However, similarly to the teleological account, whether the simulation account is a suit-
able candidate mechanism underlying ToM remains questioned. The simulation theory 
“proposes that we can understand the mental states of others on the basis of our own 
mental states” [12, 13, 34, 36]. Therefore, in contrast to the teleological account, the 
simulation theory permits the representation of the same abstract mental states, given 
that we experience our own mental states. However, having the same desire as another 
person does not necessarily permit the inference of their intentions. Hence the simula-
tion theory can be considered only a first step for mentalizing [13]. Furthermore, the 
simulation account can account for the subject-specific nature of the mental states only 
when the observer and the subject observed are very similar [13]. This has also conse-
quences on the metarepresentational ability of mentalizing. In fact, while similarity is 
essential to permit the transfer of mental perspectives, it may also be a disadvantage 
and lead to the quarantine failure [12]. That is the failure to both exclude own mental 
states (which are lacking in the agent observed) and include those possessed by the 
target (as lacking in the observer). Against the simulation theory as a base for mental-
izing is also some evidence of its inability to support action understanding in novel 
situations [36], which does not support the context-specific nature of mental states. 
Nonetheless, Keysers and Gazzola [37] proposed a model integrating the simulation 
and mentalistic accounts based on neural evidence. More specifically, the authors sug-
gested that the brain areas associated with both accounts reflect simulation, even though 
at different levels, rather than radically different processes.  
3.3  Integrating the models for a better ToM 
Although the teleological and simulation models in some respects rely on different rep-
resentations and computations, they may be important in different situations or when 
dealing with specific mental states. For example, while the teleological model might be 
useful to predict mental states early in development given its more innate nature (due 
to the central rationality principle) compared to the simulation model, the latter may 
become valuable when humans start learning from experience and relating to other peo-
ple. Similarly, while the simulation approach may be more suitable to infer mental 
states triggered by bottom-up stimuli, the teleological model may be important when 
an increasing top-down control is necessitated. In turn, the top-down control enabled 
by the mentalistic and teleological models may enable different preparation strategies 
for interaction, such as adopting a convenient posture (e.g., looking for a possible target 
of a predator before it approaches it [4]). 
In this paragraph we suggest an innovative view which is not usually taken in robot-
ics, that is the integration of the simulation and teleological models for ToM as a means 
to improve robots’ social skills. We thus propose a complementary view of the models 
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described up to date, rather than a contrasting one. In fact, although mirroring does not 
necessarily imply inference and prediction of the final intentions and beliefs of an agent, 
it may help with the action sequences necessary to reach that goal state (i.e., the trajec-
tory to reach the final state). This may favor the teleological reasoning which may pro-
vide further information to infer and predict the mental states of the agent observed. 
The same might be true also in the opposite direction. While the teleological model 
might provide information on possible trajectories of observed actions to infer the 
agent’s mental states, simulation may allow the correct inference of intentions, desires 
or beliefs by choosing between such options through internal simulation. 
4 Questions and future directions 
A great debate currently exists on whether the abstract mental states can be accessed 
through learning or if they can be innately understood. Based on what mentioned above, 
it would be reasonable to assume that they can be inferred after learning about an agent 
through repeated observations, in different contexts, with the aid of language and com-
munication [13, 14, 38]. However, the assumption that this capacity may be innate (i.e., 
derived from the supposition that conspecifics share general mental states) or driven by 
innate stimulus cues (e.g., direction of gaze or movement) also seems valid [28, 39]. It 
is possible that a combination of the two inference mechanisms occurs in humans [40]. 
Another debate concerns whether such mental states can be inferred directly from 
automatic, bottom-up effects, such as the automatic tendency to share another person’s 
experiences, or whether mostly top-down control is involved [30]. Again, these recog-
nition mechanisms may act in concert to achieve optimal mental states understanding.  
Shedding light on these processes for ToM would also mean assessing which current 
models are better describing the mentalizing ability and whether they cooperate or com-
pete with each other. Nevertheless, assigning an innate component to and a top-down 
control over the mental states inference process would support the teleological account 
as a precursor of ToM. In contrast, if a learning component and a bottom-up control are 
assumed, the simulation account could be identified as the precursor of ToM. Finally, 
if all these properties are present during ToM at different instances or when attributing 
different mental states, both the teleological and simulation models might be precursors 
of the mentalizing ability. They may however be important for specific parts of ToM. 
We would like to urge future studies to focus on the modern cross-talk between de-
velopmental studies and robotics to answer these questions. In fact, on the one hand, 
developing architectures for robots inspired by developmental mechanisms resulted in 
more sophisticated robots with increasingly complex abilities and behavior [41]. On the 
other hand, robots have been useful in the modelling of human developmental processes 
within an embodied agent and the prediction of developmental phenomena which were 
successively validated by infants studies [2]. Therefore, developing robot architectures 
based on ToM can result in increasingly complex adaptive social robots as well as in a 
new tool for investigating models from developmental psychology and provide insights 
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